British Foreign Policy in a Broken World
With the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the rules-based international order, that product of post-World War II optimism, came to an end. It had been under severe strain for some time, with major countries increasingly, in the words of Donald Trump, acting as “strong, sovereign nations”, indifferent to international law.
Russia’s indifference to international law, whether in its (two) invasions of Ukraine, its 2008 invasion of Georgia, its use of chemical weapons on foreign soil or its interference in foreign politics, is well-known. China’s territorial aggressions in the South China Sea and its repudiation of Hong Kong’s democracy are further examples of powerful countries indifferent to multilateral treaties and agreements.
Optimists might argue that the 2022 invasion of Ukraine has had the reverse impact: reviving internationalism with concerted action against Russia in the EU, in NATO and even at the United Nations. But this would be to succumb to delusions about the degree to which there is an international consensus against the war. Despite the fact that Moscow’s actions amount to attempted regime change by a former colonial power, it retains support from South Africa, and India and China continue to buy its oil (at knockdown prices).
The Ukraine war has to be seen in a wider context. It forced countries, particularly those in Europe to re-examine their assumptions about the world. Germany, for example, is going through its Zeitenwende (a historical turning point) as decades of underinvestment in its military and reliance on Russian energy are proven to have been unwise. Whilst more consistently hawkish on Russia, the post-Brexit vision of Global Britain, in which the UK largely ignored the need for trade and security co-ordination with the European Union, has also been shown to be unfit for purpose…
